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The Unsettled Foundation of the Pennsylvania
Construction Projects Statute of Repose
Suppose that, in 1975, an individual has an addition built on to
his or her home. Further assume that in 1992 the individual suffers
severe personal injury and property damage caused by the collapse
of the home improvement. When the injured homeowner attempts
to bring an action against the builder of the home improvement,
alleging professional negligence on the part of the builder, he or
she finds out that the suit against the builder is barred by opera-
tion of law. Is this possible?
Under the Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Re-
pose,' codified at Section 5536 of title 42 of the Pennsylvania Con-
solidated Statutes, this is not only possible, but is more than likely
1. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5536 provides as follows:
5536. CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
(A) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in subsection (b), a civil action or proceeding
brought against any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of any improvement to
real property must be commenced within 12 years after completion of construction of
such improvement to recover damages for:
(1) Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of con-
struction or construction of the improvement.
(2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency.
(3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
deficiency.
(4) Contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of any injury
mentioned in paragraph (2) or (3).
(B) EXCEPTIONS.-
(1) If an injury or wrongful death shall occur more than ten and within 12
years after completion of the improvement a civil action or proceeding within
the scope of subsection (a) may be commenced within the time otherwise lim-
ited by this subchapter, but not later than 14 years after completion of con-
struction of such improvement.
(2) The limitation prescribed by subsection (a) shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant or oth-
erwise, of such an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or wrongful death for which
it is proposed to commence an action or proceeding.
(c) No EXTENSION OF LIMITATION.-This section shall not extend the period within
which any civil action or proceeding may be commenced under any provision of law.
Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5536 (Purdon
1981).
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to actually happen. This statute absolves architects, engineers and
contractors (hereinafter "design professionals") from liability for
design deficiencies resulting in injury to property, personal injury,
wrongful death or contribution or indemnity for the same2 when
the cause of action accrues twelve or more years after construction
of an improvement to real property is completed.'
This commentary will discuss the origin and intent of the Penn-
sylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, examine case
law developments under the statute, and expose how the Pennsyl-
vania courts have misinterpreted the statute to afford protection
beyond its legislative intent.
I. DEFINITION OF A STATUTE OF REPOSE
A statute of repose is similar, but not identical, to a statute of
limitations.4 The similarities are that both types of statutes set
forth time periods within which actions may be commenced.' Ac-
cordingly, both statutes promote a policy of finality in legal
relationships.
By definition, statutes of repose "set a designated event for the
statutory period to start running and they provide that at the expi-
2. Id. Many other jurisdictions also have design professionals' statutes of repose. See
Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Stat-
utes of Repose, 30 Am U L Rev 579, 580 (1981). Moreover, numerous jurisdictions, Pennsyl-
vania not included, have medical malpractice statutes of repose limiting the time within
which a cause of action exists for acts of medical malpractice, product liability statutes of
repose limiting the time within which causes of action exist for injury caused by defectively
designed products, and general statutes of repose. McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 580 n 3
(cited within this note).
3. Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
5536 (Purdon 1981).
4. A statute of limitations is defined as:
A statute prescribing limitations to the right of action on certain described causes of
action or criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit shall be maintained on
such causes of action, nor any criminal charge be made, unless brought within a spec-
ified period of time after the right accrued.
Black's Law Dictionary 835 (West, 5th ed 1979).
Contemporary statutes of limitations are said to have found their origin in The Limita-
tions Act of 1623. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv L Rev 1177,
1178 (1950). The policy underlying statutes of limitations is that one should not have to
defend a claim once "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have dis-
appeared." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342, 349
(1944).
5. McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 582 (cited in note 2).
6. McGovern notes that as such, a statute of repose may encompass a statute of
limitations, with the latter having the more limited purpose reducing evidentiary inequities
on a defendant forced to defend a stale claim. Id at 583.
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ration of the period any cause of action is barred regardless of the
usual reasons for tolling. . . . " The main difference between the
two types of statutes, therefore, is that a -statute of limitation bars
a suit after a cause of action accrues, whereas a statute of repose
can operate to bar a suit before a cause of action accrues.8 This
difference stems from the time at which each of the statutes is trig-
gered. A statute of limitations is triggered once a breach of duty
has occurred, whereas a statute of repose is triggered by a point
established by the statute itself, irrespective of a breach of any
duty.9
Applying these distinctions to the hypothetical situation set
forth at the beginning of this commentary, the injured homeowner
could bring an action against all parties whom he or she felt were
responsible for the injuries and damages suffered, other than the
design professional, within the time provided by the applicable
statute of limitations. Any cause of action existing against the de-
sign professional, however, was extinguished before the homeowner
was injured because the twelve-year period set forth by the statute
of repose had expired before the injury occurred and, therefore,
before the action could have been commenced. 10
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 comment g (1979). Repose, in layman's
terms, is defined as "to lie at rest; to lie dead; to remain still or concealed." Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary 981 (G. & C. Merriam Co., 5th ed 1977).
8. Francis E. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of
Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 Forum 416, 418 (1981).
William Keeton states that "statutes of repose by their nature reimpose on some plaintiffs
the hardship of having a claim extinguished before it is discovered, or perhaps before it even
exists. . . ." W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30 at 168 (West, 5th ed
1984).
9. Timothy R. Twomey, Understanding the Legal Aspects of Design/Build 120-21
(R.S. Means Co., 1989).
Keeton observes that:
A statute of repose begins to run at an earlier date and runs for a longer period of
time that the otherwise applicable statute of limitations.. . . Repose statutes [] begin
to run upon the occurrence of a specific and identifiable event shortly thereafter-as
from the substantial completion of the structure, in actions against architects and
contractors ...
Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30 at 168 (cited in note 8).
10. The Pennsylvania courts have not provided a detailed definition of a statute of
repose. The judiciary has, however, referred to Section 5536 (originally codified in 1965 at 12
Pa Stat Section 65.1, et seq) as a statute of repose by virtue of the fact that it eliminates a
cause of action. Mitchell v United Elevator Co., 290 Pa Super 476, 434 A 2d 1243, 1248-49
(1981). It is also interesting to note that the Pennsylvania legislature consistently referred to
Section 5536 as a statute of limitations, not even mentioning the words statute of repose.
See Legislative Journal-House, 1965 at 2243-44, and Legislative Journal-Senate, 1965 at
1015.
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II. THE ORIGIN OF DESIGN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
The liability imposed on design professionals for defective de-
sign or construction of an improvement to real property has varied
throughout the ages. For example, in ancient Babylon a design
professional could receive the punishment of death for his faulty
design or construction." At common law, design professionals were
not sentenced to death for the negligent design or construction of
improvements to real property, but to warrant recovery it was re-
quired that the injured party be in privity of contract or have a
direct contractual relationship with the design professional.' 2 The
need for privity of contract survived in American jurisprudence
until the twentieth century.'
The case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. 4 led to more mod-
11. The Code of Hammurabi mandated the following:
If a builder [builds] a house for a man and [does] not make its construction firm, and
the house which he has built [collapses] and [causes] the death of the owner of the
house, that builder shall be put to death. If it [causes] the death of a son of the owner
of the house, they shall put to death a son of the builder. If it [the collapsing of the
house] [destroys] property, he shall restore whatever it destroyed, and ... he shall
rebuild the house which collapsed from his property [at his own expense]. If a builder
[builds] a house for a man and does not make its construction meet the requirements
and a wall [falls] in, that builder shall strengthen that wall at his own expense.
Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 Iowa L Rev 1221, 1221-
22 (1972-73), quoting Harper, The Code of Hammurabi 229-233 (1904).
12. The authority for this proposition is the case of Winterbottom v Wright, 10 M &
W 109, 152 Eng Rep 402 (1842). The case involved an action brought by a mail carrier who
was injured when the stagecoach on which he was travelling collapsed. Winterbottom, 152
Eng Rep 402 (1842). The court held that the carrier could not recover under the theory of
breach of a contract to maintain the stagecoach in good repair due to the fact that such a
duty was owed only to the postmaster general, and there was no privity of contract between
the contractor and the carrier. Id.
This exact rationale was applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Curtain v Somer-
set, 140 Pa 70, 21 A 244 (1891). Therein, a hotel porch collapsed and injured the plaintiff, a
guest of the hotel. Curtain, 21 A 244 (1891). The plaintiff sued the contractor for damages
because the porch was made of inferior timber. Id. The court, in ruling for the contractor,
held that the contractor owed a duty only to the hotel and that since the plaintiff was a
third party and not a party to the contract, he was owed no duty by the contractor. Id.
Articulating the necessity of privity of contract, the court reasoned:
If a contractor who erects a house, who builds a bridge, or performs any other work,
the manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery, or a steam-ship, owes a
duty to the whole world, that his work or his machine or his steam-ship shall contain
no hidden defect, it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no
prudent man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is safer and
wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties immediately concerned.
Id at 245.
13. John E. McDonald, Common Law Liability of Architects and Engineers for Neg-
ligence to Non-Contractual Parties, 9 Constr Law 5 (Apr 1989).
14. 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916).
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ern notions of the extent of a legal duty. In MacPherson, the de-
fendant was a manufacturer of automobiles who sold an automo-
bile to a retail dealer.15 The retail dealer, in turn, sold the car to
the plaintiff.' 6 The plaintiff was injured when one of the wheels,
made of defective wood, crumbled, causing him to be thrown from
the automobile.1" The New York Court of Appeals, through Justice
Cardozo, held that since the wheel was "reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made," and that since the
manufacturer knew that the car would not be used by the dealer, a
duty was indeed owed to the plaintiff by the manufacturer.'
With the fall of the requirement of privity of contract, profes-
sionals associated with the design and construction of improve-
ments to real property were suddenly exposed to liability for their
negligent acts. In response, trade associations representing design
professionals lobbied for legislation to curtail open-ended liability
for personal injury resulting from the negligent design or construc-
tion of an improvement to real property.19
It was in this climate, in 1965, that the Pennsylvania Construc-
tion Projects Statute of Repose was enacted.20 Design professionals
had achieved their goal of limiting the period of time within which
they could be held liable for the defective design and construction
of improvements to real property. The Pennsylvania legislature de-
termined that a period of twelve years after an improvement to
real property was completed was a sufficient length of time to hold
design professionals liable for their acts of professional
negligence. 2'
15. MacPherson, 217 NY 382 (1916).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. In the words of Cardozo, "If to the element of danger there is added knowl-
edge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of the thing of danger is under a duty to
make it carefully." Id.
19. McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 587 (cited in note 2).
20. The act of 1965 was substantially reenacted as Section 5536. Mitchell v United
Elevator Co., 290 Pa Super 476, 434 A2d 1243, 1248 (1981). See also 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
5536 Official Source Note, and 1965 Laws of Pennsylvania 1183.
21. See note 1 for the statutory language.
The purpose of the statute of repose, according to Representative Mebus, was to afford
design professionals protection from accusations of professional negligence long after their
engagement with a project is completed. 1965 Legislative Journal-House 2243. After
twelve years, defense of a claim is difficult because:
1. Records, however good, may have become lost or destroyed.
2. Associates or employees may have died, moved to new jobs or gone out of business.
3. Even if all parties are available, their memories have faded.
1992 685
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 5536
Freezer Storage, Inc. v Armstrong Cork Co.2 2 was the case in
which the constitutionality of the Construction Projects Statute of
Repose was challenged.2 3 Freezer Storage involved a defendant
who planned, designed and installed insulation in the ceiling of a
low-temperature warehouse owned by the plaintiff.24 The ceiling
was periodically repaired by another company, but it eventually
collapsed and the plaintiff subsequently sued both the construction
company and the maintenance company to recover damages for
the negligent construction and repair of the ceiling.25
The. design professional who constructed the ceiling filed prelim-
inary objections to the plaintiff's complaint, contending that it was
immune from liability under the Construction Projects Statute of
Repose.26 The defendant relied on the fact that work had been
completed on the warehouse ceiling more than twelve years before
the plaintiff's action was instituted.2 7 Freezer Storage then chal-
Id. Representative Mebus noted that, "The facts relating to the occurrence causing the suit
are fresh [while] the facts relating to the design or construction are history and, therefore,
far more difficult to establish with the same clarity." Id. He closed his remarks by stating
that design professionals relinquish control once they complete their work and, as such,
have a difficult time proving that misuse or abuse had taken place over the course of time.
Id at 2244.
Senator Sesler, who voted against the statute of repose, remarked that a plaintiff has to
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence and that if he can meet this burden by
proving that his injuries were caused by the defective design or construction of an improve-
ment to real property, he should not be denied recovery simply because he sufferred his
injuries more than twelve years after the project was completed. 1965 Legislative Jour-
nal-Senate 1015. Despite Sesler's comments, the bill passed by a large majority. Id.
22. 476 Pa 270, 382 A2d 715 (1978).
23. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d 715 (1978). According to McGovern, such a challenge
entails:
philosophical attitudes towards natural rights and utility, social and moral concerns
of fault and compensation, and economic theories of free enterprise and socialism.
• . . The constitutional issues also raise fundamental concerns regarding the roles of
the Constitution, the legislatures, and the courts in our political system. Opponents
of a statute of repose ask, "Can and should a legislature abolish a cause of action
before it accrues?" Proponents ask "Can and should a court deny the legislature its
power to define the scope of compensable harm?" At issue is the appropriate balance
between a state constitution and the federal Constitution, the role of the legislature
to represent the popular will, and the duty of the court to preserve rights without
encroaching upon legislative prerogatives.
McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 581 (cited in note 2).
24. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 717.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id at 718.
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lenged the constitutionality of the statute.2" The first of Freezer
Storage's three-part assault on the statute of repose was that the
Act constituted a "special law" because it created an irrational dis-
tinction between design professionals and others involved in im-
proving real property, such as building suppliers and landowners
to whom the statute does not apply.29 As such, argued the plaintiff,
the statute violated the Pennsylvania Constitution."0
The supreme court disposed of this argument by first noting that
the standard of review for determining whether an act of the legis-
lature is a special law is to decifer whether there are real distinc-
tions between the classifications in the statute.31 The supreme
court found three rational distinctions for the statutory classifica-
tion.2 The court first noted that design professionals may be liable
28. Id. Both the trial court and the superior court held the statute of repose to be
constitutional. Id.
29. Id. The Construction Projects Statute of Repose was first challenged as being an
example of special legislation in Misitis v Steel City Piping Co., 441 Pa 339, 272 A2d 883
(1971). The court did not decide the constitutional question because it was not necessary for
the resolution of the controversy. Misitis, 272 A2d at 884. The plaintiff was injured at a
sewage disposal plant and brought a negligence action against both the consulting engineer
and the general contractor of the plant. Id at 883. The accident occurred five days before
the enactment of the statute of repose and the court held that since the legislature clearly
clearly expressed that the statute was to take effect July 1, 1966, the design professionals
could not take advantage of an act that was obviously prospective in its application. Id at
884. Thus, the question of special legislation was never reached. Id.
30. Id. Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or
can be provided for by general law and specifically the General Assembly shall not
pass any local law or special law:
7. Regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing...
Pa Const, Art III, § 32.
McGovern notes "special law" arguments based on equal protection are common in cases
challenging the constitutional propriety of statutes of repose and are premised on questions
such as:
Should an architect or contractor be given constitutional immunity from suits involv-
ing personal injuries caused by the design or fabrication of a building when the owner
of that building or a materialman who provided products in the design and
fabrication of that building would not be immunized? Is there constitutional justifica-
tion for denying recovery to a person injured by the design of a building but allowing
recovery to a person injured by the design of a component product in the same build-
ing? Can injuries caused by real property be treated any differently from injuries
caused by personal property?
McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 606-07 (cited in note 2).
31. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 718. The court cited Dufour v Maize, 385 Pa 309, 56
A2d 675, 677 (1948), quoting Seabolt v Commissioners, 187 Pa 318, 41 A 22 (1898), for this
proposition. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 718.
32. Id.
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to a larger class of persons than would landowners, so the legisla-
ture could rationally limit the liability of design professionals with-
out limiting the liability of landowners."3 It was also reasoned that
design professional liability can sound under various legal theories
while landowner liability usually sounds only in tort, and that
landowners can avoid liability by taking care of their land while
design professionals have no such control over their product once
it is completed, so a limit on design professional liability is based
on real distinctions.
3 4
Next, Freezer Storage argued that the statute of repose violated
the constitution by denying access to the courts.3 5 The court dis-
agreed and held that the law must be flexible and accurately reflect
societal changes. 6 Accordingly, a cause of action that exists one
day can be constitutionally precluded on a later day.3 7 The su-
33. Id.
34. Id. Freezer Storage also argued that the statute of repose should be declared in-
valid because it exempts design professionals but not building suppliers from liability twelve
years after the completion of a project. Id at 719. The court reasoned that suppliers who
mass produce products can control the quality of their goods in a factory while design pro-
fessionals are very limited in the ways in which they can pre-test their product and that
each of their projects is in some way unique. Id. Thus, the court concluded that any classifi-
cation between the liability of design professionals and that of building suppliers is "based
on real differences in the business world" and not contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. Id.
35. Id at 720. The guarantee of access to the courts is contained in Article 1, section
11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which reads:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay....
Pa Const, Art I, § 11.
McGovern observes that such a constitutional clause is traceable to the Magna Carta,
which provides that:
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished,
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, or send upon him, except by the
legal judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land ... [and] to no one will we
sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice.
McGovern, 30 Am U L Rev at 615 (cited in note 2).
36. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 720.
37. Id. The court cited numerous examples of when such a jurisprudential change
was necessary. Id. The cases include: Sherwood v Elgart, 383 Pa 110, 117 A2d 899 (1955) (a
statute excusing innkeepers from liability to guests for losses that were compensable at com-
mon law was upheld even though a common law cause of action was extinguished); Singer v
Shepard, 464 Pa 387, 346 A2d 897, 903 (1975) (upholding a mandatory "no fault" auto
insurance statute which replaced certain tort causes of action); Jackman v Rosenbaum Co.,
263 Pa 158, 106 A 238, 244 (1919), aft'd, 260 US 22 (1922) (legislative and judicial power to
modify remedies available to owners of land involved in party-wall disputes was sustained);
Fadgen v Lenkner, 469 Pa 272, 365 A2d 147 (1976) (time-honored cause of action for crimi-
nal conversation abolished). Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 720.
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preme court also stated that the notion of separation of powers
bestows upon the legislature the "ability to guide the development
of the law" in such a manner that may abolish a pre-existing cause
of action.38
Finally, Freezer Storage argued that the statute of repose
clashed with the Pennsylvania Constitution in that the statute lim-
ited the amount which may be recovered for an injury.3" The court
simply stated that recovery has not been limited, rather the entire
cause of action has, in certain cases, been eliminated.0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus concluded that the Con-
struction Projects Statute of Repose did not violate the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution in any way suggested by Freezer Storage.41
IV. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A party seeking protection under the statute of repose must
prove three things.42 First, the moving party must show that what
has been supplied to the real property in question constitutes an
improvement to that property.43 Second, the movant must show
that a period of twelve years has elapsed between the completion
of the project and the date of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Finally, the moving party must show that the activity it was en-
gaged in was within the class intended to be protected by the
statute.4
A. Improvement to Real Property
The statute of repose fails to provide a definition as to what con-
stitutes an improvement to real property. 45 Accordingly, the Penn-
38. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 721.
39. Id. Article III, Section 18 is the applicable provision and provides:
In no ... cases [except Workmen's Compensation] shall the General Assembly limit
the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or
property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive,
and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be
prosecuted.
Pa Const, Art Ill, § 18.
40. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 721. Such reasoning provides insight as to the court's
statutory designation of Section 5536. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the differentiation between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose.
41. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 721.
42. McConnaughey v Building Components, Inc., 401 Pa Super 329, 585 A2d 485,
487 (1990), aoc granted, 527 Pa 667, 593 A2d 842 (1991).
43. McConnaughey, 585 A2d at 487.
44. Id.
45. See note 1 for the applicable statutory language. The predecessor statute to Sec-
1992
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sylvania Supreme Court, in the recent case of McCormick v Co-
lumbus Conveyor Co.,46 adopted the definition of "improvement"
from Black's Law Dictionary.47 That definition, according to the
McCormick court, comports with the ordinary and common usage
of the word "improvement" in providing that an improvement is
not simply a replacement or repair to property, but a valuable ad-
dition thereto.48 The Pennsylvania courts consistently gave a lib-
eral interpretation to the term "improvement," even before the
McCormick court espoused the Black's Law Dictionary defini-
tion.49 The federal courts, in interpreting Section 5536, have like-
wise given broad meaning to the term "improvement."50 Thus, the
tion 5536 also came without a legislative definition of the term "improvement." 12 Pa Con
Stat § 65.1 (repealed Pub L No 202 § 2(a)[1391], Apr 28, 1978).
46. 522 Pa 520, 564 A2d 907 (1989).
47. "Improvement" is defined in Black's as follows:
A valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its
condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or cap-
ital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or
further purposes ...
Black's Law Dictionary 682 (West, 5th ed 1979).
48. McCormick, 564 A2d at 909.
49. See, for example, Radvan v General Electric Co., 394 Pa Super 501, 576 A2d 396
(1990) (weld and side trim machine inside steel plant constitutes an improvement to real
property for purposes of Section 5536); Fetterhoff v Fetterhoff, 354 Pa Super 438, 512 A2d
30 (1986) (elevator shaft is an improvement to real property); Catanzaro v Wasco Products,
Inc., 339 Pa Super 481, 489 A2d 262 (1985) (skydome is "virtually identical to a window"
and windows are held to be fixtures and fixture is, by definition, an improvement to real
prpoerty); Mitchell v United Elevator Co., 290 Pa Super 476, 434 A2d 1243 (1981) (elevator
is an improvement to real property); Keeler v Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 56
Pa Commw 236, 424 A2d 614 (1981) (highway guard rails, directional signals, lights and
signs constitute improvements to real property). See also Stellute v Realty Operating Co.,
131 PLJ 162 (Pa Corn P1, Allegheny Cty 1982) (revolving door is an improvement to real
property); Fromm v Frankhouser, 7 Pa D&C 3d 560 (Pa Corn P1, Lancaster Cty 1977) (fur-
nace in mobile home rises to the level of improvement to real property). But see, Ferricks v
Ryan Homes, Inc., 396 Pa Super 132, 578 A2d 441 (1990) (formaldehyde vapors on plywood
do not constitute an improvement to real property).
50. See, for example, Luzadder v Despatch Oven Co., 651 F Supp 239 (W D Pa
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 834 F2d 355 (3d Cir 1987) (gas-fired bottle-making mold oven
is an improvement to real property); Springman v Wire Machinery Corp. of Am., 666 F
Supp 66 (M D Pa 1987) (tubular closer machine in wire rope facility constitutes an improve-
ment to real property); Gnall v Illinois Water Treatment Co., 640 F Supp 815 (M D Pa
1986) (tank in water treatment plant is an improvement to real property); Kovach v Crane
Co., M D Pa No 82-0530, slip op (May 18, 1983) (steam boiler is an improvement to real
property).
Interestingly, the courts in Kovach, Gnall and Springman invoked the "assembled plant
doctrine" for determining whether an addition to real property is an improvement thereto
for purposes of Section 5536. That doctrine, first articulated in Singer v Redevelopment
Authority of Oil City, 437 Pa 55, 261 A2d 594 (1970), provides that if a piece of machinery
is both integral to the business operations of an industrial plant and a'permanent installa-
tion in such a plant, than the machinery is considered an improvement to the real property
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issue of what constitutes an improvement to real property, for pur-
poses of the Construction Projects Statute of Repose, is well
settled.
B. Twelve-Year Period
Section 5536 shields design professionals from liability for inju-
ries to property or persons or for design defects occurring twelve
years after the construction of an improvement to real property is
completed.5 ' The twelve-year period has been the subject of little
litigation. Two important developments, however, have affected
the expanse of the statute of repose. First, the twelve-year period
begins to run when the entire construction project is completed to
the extent that it can be used by the general public.52 Second,
maintenance or service work performed on a completed improve-
ment to real property does not revitalize the twelve-year period. 53
Once the project is amenable to public use, repair work does not
constitute a new improvement to real property with a new com-
mencement of the repose period. 4 As a result of the clarity of the
language in the statute of repose on the issue of the twelve-year
period, this facet of Section 5536 is on a stable foundation.
C. Statutorily Protected Class
Having proven that what was supplied was an improvement to
real property and that more than twelve years have passed be-
tween the completion of the improvement and the injury, a party
seeking protection under the Construction Projects Statute of Re-
pose also must show that the activity it was engaged in was within
the class protected by the statute.5 5 Section 5536 protects "any
person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning, su-
on which it is located. Springman, 666 F Supp at 68. The Pennsylvania state courts have
not mentioned the "assembled plant doctrine" in analyzing the improvement to real prop-
erty issue of Section 5536.
51. Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
5536(a). See note 1 for the complete statutory language.
52. Catanzaro, 489 A2d at 266 n 7, citing Patraka v Armco Steel Co., 495 F Supp
1013 (M D Pa 1980), wherein the court reasoned that the statutory language "after comple-
tion of the construction of such improvement" indicated that the legislature intended the
repose period to begin at the point at which third parties are first exposed to any defect of
construction or design. Patraka, 495 F Supp at 1019.
53. Fetterhoff, 512 A2d at 33.
54. Id.
55. McConnaughey v Building Components, 401 Pa Super 329, 585 A2d 485, 487
(1990), alloc granted, 527 Pa 667, 593 A2d 842 (1991).
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pervision or observation of construction, or construction of any im-
provement to real property. '"56
The Pennsylvania state courts, however, have interpreted the
statute of repose in a manner different than the federal courts in
Pennsylvania. 57 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that
manufacturers of products that are incorporated into real property
improvements are within the class protected under Section 5536,
while the Third Circuit and the district courts in Pennsylvania
have held that manufacturers are not covered under the statute.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. 8
The available legislative history of the original statute of repose,
enacted in 1965, indicates that the the statute was intended to
limit the liability of architects, engineers, contractors and design-
ers who perform or furnish the design, planning, supervision or ob-
servation of construction, or construction of an improvement to
real property.59 The judicial extension of protection under the stat-
ute of repose to include manufacturers is not only contrary to the
legislative intent of the statute of repose, but also undercuts Penn-
sylvania product liability law. The policy behind Pennsylvania
product liability law is that one who manufactures a defective
product is subject to liability for injury caused as a result of that
defect.6 0 To reason that a manufacturer of a defective product that
is incorporated into a real property improvement is given immu-
nity from liability under the statute of repose, but that the manu-
facturer of that same defective product is liable for injury resulting
from the defect when the product is not part of an improvement to
real property, is nonsensical. The superior court, however, has used
this line of reasoning in determining that manufacturers fall within
56. Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
5536(a) (Purdon 1981).
57. Compare Catanzaro v Wasco Products, Inc., 339 Pa Super 481, 489 A2d 262
(1985) (manufacturer of skylight covered under Section 5536), with Luzadder v Despatch
Oven Co., 834 F2d 355 (3d Cir 1987) (manufacturers of products that become incorporated
into real property improvements not intended to be shielded from liability under Section
5536).
58. McCormick v Columbus Conveyer Co., 522 Pa 520, 564 A2d 907, 911 (1989).
59. See 1965 Legislative Journal-Senate 1015 (remarks of Senator Sesler included
the following: "I have never been under the impression that undue harassment has occurred
to contractors, architects or designers, so as to necessitate this type of legislation . . .")
(emphasis supplied), and 1965 Legislative Journal-House 2243 (Representative Mebus re-
marked: "Senate bill 307 [the predecessor of today's Construction Projects statute of repose]
establishes a statute of limitations for architects, engineers and contractors") (emphasis
supplied).
60. Webb v Zern, 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966).
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the class protected under the statute of repose.
The issue of the scope of protection afforded by the statute of
repose was first addressed in Leach v Philadelphia Savings Fund
Society." Leach involved a plaintiff injured while remodeling the
interior of the defendant savings association.2 The ceiling inside
the building collapsed, causing the plaintiff severe injury. 3 The
plaintiff thereafter sued, among others, the landowner of the prem-
ises, the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society. 4 The landowner
claimed immunity from suit under the statute of repose and the
trial court agreed that the statute shielded the landowner from
liability.
6 5
On appeal, the superior court reversed, holding that subsection
466 of the statute of repose cannot be construed to protect a land-
owner unless he has designed, planned, supervised or observed the
construction, or constructed the improvement to real property.67
The court found no evidence that the Philadelphia Savings Fund
Society participated in any of the statute's enumerated activities,
thus the landowner could not claim protection under the statute of
repose.68
Commenting on the scope of protection afforded under the stat-
ute, the superior court stated:
The Pennsylvania statute identifies its class not by the status or occupation
of its members but rather by the contribution or acts done in relation to the
improvement to real property. Thus the statute immunizes from liability
after 12 years "any" person lawfully performing or furnishing [the enumer-
ated] activities. The word "any" is generally used in the sense of "all" or
"every" and its meaning is most comprehensive.69
Clearly, the superior court was stressing the need for a defendant
to participate in the legislatively prescribed activities in relation to
the actual real property improvement.7 0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the
61. 234 Pa Super 486, 340 A2d 491 (1975).




66. The Act of 1965, 12 Pa Stat § 65.1 et seq (repealed Pub L No 202 § 2(a)[1391],
Apr 28, 1978), was in effect at the time of the Leach decision. Section 4 of the predecessor
statute was virtually identical to subsection (b)(2) of Section 5536. See note 1 for the statu-
tory language of Section 5536.
67. Leach, 340 A2d at 493-94.
68. Id.




statutorily protected class in Freezer Storage, the case in which
the statute of repose was held to not violate the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.7 1 The argument was made that the statute of repose was
an unconstitutional special law because it created an irrational dis-
tinction between builders and suppliers.72 The court, without spe-
cifically ruling on what parties or what activities were protected
under the statute of repose, hypothesized that even if the statute
did apply to builders of real property improvements while not ap-
plying to suppliers of the products used in those improvements,
such a classification would be justified.7 3 Suppliers can easily main-
tain high quality-controlled standards in a factory, wherein they
can test their items before distributing them into the stream of
commerce, reasoned the court, while builders have very few ways
of pre-testing their designs.74 According to the Freezer Storage
court, "The Legislature can rationally conclude that the conditions
under which builders work are sufficiently difficult that limitations
should be placed on their liabilities, but not on the liabilities of
suppliers. ' 75 Thus the supreme court suggested that the statute
could be applied to limit the liability of builders but not limit the
liability of suppliers without violating the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
The issue of the scope of protection afforded under the statute
of repose was dealt with in dictum in both Leach and Freezer
Storage, but neither case set forth binding precedent on what ac-
tivities or what parties are afforded protection by the statute.
The exact source of the extension of coverage of the statute of
repose to include manufacturers is unclear. A manufacturer was
shielded from liability under Section 5536 in Catanzaro v Wasco
Products, Inc., 6 but the Catanzaro court stated that protection
under the statute of repose was judicially extended to include de-
fendant manufacturers in Mitchell v United Elevator Co.
77
Mitchell involved a man who was injured when he slipped and
fell as he entered an elevator in the apartment building in which
he resided. 8 Unknown to the resident when he stepped into the
71. Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 721. See notes 22-41 for a detailed discussion of the
Freezer Storage decision.




76. 339 Pa Super 481, 489 A2d 262 (1985).
77. 290 Pa Super 476, 434 A2d 1243 (1981).
78. Mitchell, 434 A2d at 1244.
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elevator, its floor was approximately twelve inches lower than the
level of the building floor.7 9 One of the named defendants in the
suit was Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the company that
designed and installed the elevator.8 0 The superior court held that
the construction of the elevator was the construction of an im-
provement to real property, and thus Westinghouse was afforded
protection under the statute of repose."'
A close reading of the Mitchell opinion reveals that the superior
court's decision did not hinge on whether the statute of repose
should apply to manufacturers whose products are incorporated
into real property improvements.2 Rather, the issue before the
court was whether the construction of an elevator in an apartment
building was the construction of an improvement to real prop-
erty."' The superior court held that the elevator did constitute an
improvement to real property, as it fell within the Black's Law
Dictionary definition of the term "improvement." 4 The superior
court did not even consider the issue of whether the activity West-
inghouse was engaged in was within the kind intended to be pro-
tected by the statute, thus, it cannot accurately be stated that the
Mitchell court extended the scope of protection afforded under the
statute of repose to include manufacturers whose products are in-
corporated into improvements to real property.85 Therefore, Ca-
tanzaro relied on Mitchell for a proposition not even addressed in
Mitchell.
The problem with the superior court's Catanzaro decision is that
it runs afoul of Pennsylvania product liability law. In Webb v
Zern,s8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the product liability law of
79. Id. The plaintiff died of causes unrelated to the accident after the suit was com-
menced. Id.
80. Id at 1245.
81. Id at 1249.
82. Id.
83. Id. There was no issue regarding the twelve-year period as the elevator was in-
stalled in the apartment building in 1950 and the plaintiff decedent suffered his injuries in
1974. Id at 1248.
84. Id at 1249.
85. The practitioner should know that the Mitchell court also stated that because the
statute of repose completely eliminates a cause of action against any person lawfully per-
forming or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or
construction of an improvement to real property, the statute is non-waivable and need not
be pleaded as a statute of limitations defense pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1030. Id.
86. 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966).
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the Commonwealth. 7 The policy underlying Section 402A was to
protect victims of defective products while putting the risk of loss
on the suppliers and manufacturers who place those products into
the stream of commerce. 8 The Catanzaro decision undercuts the
policy of Section 402A in that it relieves a manufacturer of liability
if his product has been fortuitously incorporated into an improve-
ment to real property. 9 The manufacturer would otherwise be lia-
ble for placing the same product in the flow of commerce if the
product was not incorporated into a real property improvement.9 0
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had a chance to rectify the
unsound and unsupported decision of the Catanzaro court, but
failed to do so in McCormick. That case involved a worker whose
arm was caught in a belt conveyor, rendering him permanently
partially disabled."' The plaintiff brought an action alleging defec-
tive design and manufacture of a coal delivery system installed at
Bucknell University in 1948, on which he was injured in 1982.92
The action was commenced against a construction company, an en-
gineering company, and a conveyor company. 3 The plaintiff's com-
87. The following language was adopted by the Webb court:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and care of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Webb, 220 A2d at 854, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
88. Azzarello v Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa 547, 391 A2d 1020 (1978).
89. Catanzaro, 489 A2d at 265.
90. One commentator has observed:
Since an item can become affixed to real property, manufacturers may have a conven-
ient bar to claims depending on whether the defectively manufactured product is
deemed to be [an improvement to real property].
Comment, Defective Design-Wisconsin's Limitation of Action Statute for Architects,
Contractors and Others Involved in Design and Improvement to Real Property, 63 Marq L
Rev 87, 111 (1979).
Additionally, it is recognized that the Webb decision was handed down subsequent to the
enactment of the original statute of repose, but the judiciary has not made an exception to
Section 402A for improvements to real property.
91. McCormick, 564 A2d at 908-09.
92. Id. Clearly, there was no argument as to whether the twelve-year period had
elapsed. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text for a thorough explanation of the twelve-
year period.
93. McCormick, 564 A2d at 908.
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plaint alleged that the defendants "jointly and severally designed,
manufactured, and sold" the system causing him injury.94 All three
defendants filed and were granted motions for summary judgment
based on the Construction Projects Statute of Repose.95 All three
motions were affirmed on appeal to the superior court 8 McCor-
mick thereafter sought and was granted allowance of appeal by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review of the granting of the mo-
tion for summary judgment in favor of Columbus Conveyer
Company.
9 7
The supreme court first addressed the issue of whether the con-
veyor was an improvement to real property." The court held that
the coal delivery system was an improvement to real property be-
cause the system fell under the Black's Law Dictionary definition
of the term "improvement." 99
The appellant next argued that if the belt conveyor was an im-
provement to real property, there were two reasons as to why Co-
lumbus was not within the class of persons protected by the stat-
ute. °00 First, the appellant claimed that Section 5536 applied only
to architects, engineers, and contractors. 1°1 The supreme court
cited Leach for the proposition that the statute of repose was con-
cerned with the contribution to the improvement of real property
made by the defendant rather than the status of that defendant.102
94. Id.
95. Id at 909. Sordoni Construction Company and Rust Engineering Company had
their motions granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County while Columbus
Conveyer Company didn't file its motion for summary judgment until the case was trans-
ferred to Union County, where Columbus' motion was ultimately granted. Id.
96. Id. The disposition of the motions was affirmed at 369 Pa Super 655, 531 A2d 531
(1987).
97. McCormick, 564 A2d at 909-10.
98. Id at 909. See notes 45-50 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this
issue under Section 5536.
99. McCormick, 564 A2d at 909. The definition adopted by the supreme court ap-
pears in Blacks Law Dictionary 682 (5th ed 1979).
The plaintiff made an additional argument that the belt conveyor was a "product" and
hence not an "improvement to real property." McCormick, 564 A2d at 909. The court dis-
posed of the argument by holding that the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the appel-
lant were not persuasive because many of them held that belt conveyors were "products" for
purposes of products liability personal injury accidents, but they did not declare that belt
conveyors were products and not real property improvements. Id. Some of the cited cases
did apparently deal with products that were improvements to real property and the courts
in those cases did not hold that improvements to real property could not be considered
products. Id.




Indeed Leach did focus on the defendant's contribution to the im-
provement, but it did not suggest that the intended scope of pro-
tection afforded under the statute of repose be ignored.
In a footnote the court also stated that, to the extent the appel-
lant's argument that the statute applies only to architects, engi-
neers and contractors rests on the remarks of individual legislators,
such remarks are irrelevant in determining the meaning of a stat-
ute. 03 The court cited the case of In Re Martin's Estate0 for this
proposition. The exact language of the Martin decision provides
that "in ascertaining . . . legislative meaning, while what is said in
debate is not relevant, the report of a legislative commission or a
Senate or House committee may, if obscurity or ambiguity exists,
be considered."' 05 Ambiguity most certainly exists regarding the
scope of protection afforded by the statute of repose. Under ordi-
nary circumstances, the remarks of individual legislators would not
be relevant in ascertaining the legislative intent of a statute be-
cause legislators can manipulate the legislative record to provide
an interpretation of a statutory provision which might otherwise be
interpreted differently. 0 6 However, the legislative history of the
statute of repose includes consistent remarks regarding the in-
tended scope of protection afforded under the statute offered by
both a proponent of the statute and an opponent of the statute,
and should thus be given some weight.1
0 7
Appellant next argued that the statute of repose was not in-
tended to protect a manufacturer of a product that happens to be
incorporated by a third party as an improvement to real prop-
erty. 08 The supreme court, however, stated that appellant had an-
swered interrogatories in such a manner that indicated that all
three defendants were equally and inseparably involved in not only
the manufacture of the belt conveyor but also in its design and
103. McCormick, 564 A2d at 910 n 1.
104. 365 Pa 280, 74 A2d 120 (1950).
105. [In re Martin's Estate], 74 A2d at 122 (citations omitted).
106. Under this view, courts are reluctant to use legislative history because of "the
tendency of legislators and legislative staff members to 'plant' statements and commentary
in the legislative history for the sole reason of influencing later interpretation of the stat-
ute." William P. Statsky, Legislative Analysis and Drafting 110 (West, 2d ed 1984).
107. Senator Sesler, opposed to the passage of the statute of repose, stated that such a
statute was not needed to protect contractors, architects or designers, while Representative
Mebus, a proponent of the statute, stated that architects, engineers and contractors should
have a limit placed on their liability. See 1965 Legislative Journal-Senate 1015, and 1965
Legislative Journal-House 2243.
108. McCormick, 564 A2d at 910.
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sale.10 9 According to the court, the belt conveyor was a piece of
machinery made for a specific purpose and location according to
plans and specifications, and defendant Columbus Conveyor Com-
pany was more than a mere manufacturer of a product that was
incorporated into an improvement to real property. 1 0 Therefore,
the question of whether the statute of repose applied to manufac-
turers was not before the court and need not be decided."' Hence
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not determine the scope of
coverage afforded under the statute of repose based on statements
made in the complaint of the appellant and one interrogatory
answer.
1 2
Justice Larsen dissented, arguing that the majority misread both
the statute and the plaintiff's complaint and interrogatories.1 3
Justice Larsen's reading of the statute focused on the fact that a
defendant engaged in the statutorily enumerated activi-
ties-performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or
observation of construction or construction of an improvement to
real property'14 -must be performing the activities on an actual
improvement to real property." 5 Justice Larsen argued:
A manufacturer does nothing other than supply the component products for
109. Id. The answer to defendant Columbus' interrogatory, as propounded by appel-
lant, stated that:
The design and manufacture of the product in question cannot be said to be the sole
effort of any one defendant. Each defendant substantially participated in different
phases of the design and manufacture of this product. The efforts of all three defend-




111. Id at 911.
112. The majority did, however, provide some language revealing how it might have
handled the issue of protection, or lack thereof, afforded manufacturers under the statute of
repose if it was determined that the issue was before the court when it stated, "The argu-
ment portraying Columbus as simply the manufacturer of a particular machine which is
related to the realty only by the fact that it is bolted to the floor, is contrary to the allega-
tions in the complaint and the plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories." Id at 910. The court
also noted that, "It is abundantly clear from the record that Columbus did more than sup-
ply a standard piece of equipment, indistinguishable from any other it mass-produced, that
by chance became affixed to the University's property." Id.
If the issue of manufacturer protection under Section 5536 were before-the court, perhaps
the defendant would have had to prove that his product had been made specifically for the
real property in question rather than simply rolling off the assembly line and fortuitously
ending up as part of a real property improvement at Bucknell University.
113. Id at 911.
114. Pennsylvania Construction Projects Statute of Repose, 42 Pa Cons Stat § 5536(a)
(Purdon 1981). See note 1 for the complete statutory language.
115. McCormick, 564 A2d at 911.
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an improvement to real property. The fact that a manufacturer designs and
plans those component products is irrelevant under the statute, since the
statute is concerned with only those persons involved in the design, plan-
ning, supervision, or construction of the improvement to real property
itself."5i
The conclusion follows, therefore, that the statute of repose does
not protect a manufacturer who supplies a defective product that
is incorporated into a real property improvement." 7 Justice Larsen
then stated that appellant alleged that Columbus manufactured
the product that caused his injury; therefore, this was an appropri-
ate case to determine if the statute of repose applies to manufac-
turers whose products are incorporated into real estate by others
as improvements."8
In sum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach the issue
of the scope of protection afforded under the Construction Projects
Statute of Repose. As a result of the McCormick court's not reach-
ing the issue, the unreasoned Catanzaro decision remains the law
and supports the proposition that the statute of repose does apply
to manufacturers whose products are incorporated into real prop-
erty improvements by others." 9
The federal courts sitting in diversity cases in Pennsylvania have
approached the issue of the scope of coverage under the statute of
repose by largely determining that Section 5536 does not relieve
116. Id (emphasis in original).
117. Id. Justice Larsen, in making this argument, referred to the hypothetical situa-
tion set forth in Freezer Storage, 382 A2d at 719, where it was stated that the legislature
could rationally conclude that builders work under difficult conditions such that their liabil-
ity should be limited, whereas suppliers work in the controlled atmosphere of a factory
where precautions can be taken such that their liability should not be limited. Accordingly,
Justice Larsen concluded that Columbus manufactured the belt conveyor at issue in a fac-
tory amenable to quality-control standards of the kind that do not warrant a limitation on
the liability of Columbus Conveyor Company. McCormick, 564 A2d at 911.
118. McCormick, 564 A2d at 911.
119. The Catanzaro reasoning was followed in McConnaughey v Building Compo-
nents, Inc., 401 Pa Super 329, 585 A2d 485 (1990), where it was held that the manufacturer
of a roof truss was protected under Section 5536 after a barn collapsed causing property and
livestock damage to the plaintiff, notwithstanding McCormick. But see Ferricks v Ryan
Homes, Inc., 396 Pa Super 132, 578 A2d 441 (1990), where plywood board manufacturers
were not given protection under Section 5536 in an action commenced by a homeowner who
suffered property damage and personal injuries due to exposure to formaldehyde vapors
from building materials within the home. Ferricks, 578 A2d 443. The court not only deter-
mined that plywood does not constitute an "improvement," but also that plywood is the
type of product which is not itself an improvement to real property, but only a component
thereof. Based on McCormick, Section 5536 was not intended to provide insulation to a




manufacturers from liability for their defective products that are
incorporated by others as improvements to real property.120 This
result has been reached based on thorough analysis and examina-
tion of the applicable legislative history, the relevant case law, and
the underlying policy considerations.
The issue of the scope of the statute of repose was first decided
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania in Kovach v Crane Co. 2' This case was before the
court in 1983, prior to the Catanzaro opinion, but subsequent to
the superior court's Mitchell decision. The court noted that there
was no precedent on the issue of whether the statute of repose was
intended to protect manufacturers whose products become real
property improvements, as the issue was not squarely addressed in
Mitchell or any prior decision.
122
The product at issue before the district court was a boiler that
exploded at a container company and caused the death of one of
the employees at the factory. l2 An action was commenced on be-
half of the employee killed in the accident. 124 The district court
reasoned that the boiler was not an improvement to real property
at the time of its manufacture and it was not made for a specific
use or location.'125 The boiler was simply a standard product dis-
tributed by the manufacturer which became attached to real prop-
erty.126 Thus the Kovach court, upon close review of the text of
Section 5536, determined that the manufacturer of the boiler was
not within the class of persons intended to be protected under the
Construction Projects Statute of Repose because the boiler became
an improvement to real property only upon installation at the fac-
tory. 27 The manufacturer did not design, plan, supervise, or ob-
serve the construction of, or construct an improvement to real
property. 28
120. See Gnall v Illinois Water Treatment Co., 640 F Supp 815 (M D Pa 1986), for
the opposite result, where it was held that the manufacturer of a tank at a water treatment
facility was immune from liability under Section 5536 in an action commenced by an indi-
vidual who slipped and fell from the tank, based on the Catanzaro rationale. Gnall, 640 F
Supp at 821.
121. M D Pa No 82-0530, slip op (May 18, 1983).
122. Kovach, M D Pa No 82-0530, slip op at 7.
123. Id at 2.
124. Id. The twelve-year period was not at issue and the court determined that the
boiler was an improvement to real property. Id at 7.
125. Id.





This same issue was next before the eastern district court in
Vasquez v Whiting Corp.,12 9 a post-Catanzaro decision involving a
plaintiff who slipped and fell from a crane at the place of his em-
ployment.130 The court held that the statute of repose was not in-
tended to protect manufacturers of defective products that are in-
corporated onto real property improvements.' 3' This conclusion
was reached by reviewing the legislative history of the statute of
repose, policy considerations underlying the statute of repose,
132
and product liability considerations adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Webb. 33 The district court set forth the follow-
ing hypothetical showing the absurdity of the the Catanzaro hold-
ing that a manufacturer of a defective product is shielded from
liability if his product is incorporated into a real property
improvement:
A manufacturer of... a defective above-ground swimming pool could be
held liable beyond the twelve year period of limitations only if the swim-
ming pool had not yet become an "improvement to real property." Yet...
the same manufacturer would be immune from liability if a third party at-
tached the swimming pool to real property so as to make the pool an "im-
provement to real property."""4
The middle federal district court again heard the issue in
Springman v Wire Machinery Corp. of Am.' 5 In Springman the
plaintiff's decedent was killed when he was struck by a bobbin that
was ejected from a tubular closer that the defendant had manufac-
tured.13 6 It was held that the manufacturer was not within the
class intended to be protected by the statute of repose. 37 The
court stated that Section 5536 was intended to protect those in-
volved in the construction of real property improvements, not
those who manufacture products that are adjoined to improve-
129. 660 F Supp 685 (E D Pa 1987).
130. Vasquez, 660 F Supp at 686.
131. Id at 689.
132. Id. The court stated that the legislative history of the statute revealed that archi-
tects, engineers and contractors might be found liable for accidents occurring long after
their retirement and thus should have their liability shielded, while manufacturers are gen-
erally corporations having an indefinite lifespan and the ability to insure against and spread
risk. Id.
133. Id. See notes 86-90 for a thorough discussion of these considerations.
134. Vasquez, 660 F Supp at 689.
135. 666 F Supp 66 (M D Pa 1987).
136. Springman, 666 F Supp at 67.
137. Id. It was determined that the closer was an improvement to real property and
there was no issue of the twelve-year period as it had clearly lapsed. Id at 67-68.
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ments to real property.' The court stated that the Catanzaro de-
cision placed too little emphasis on the legislative history of the
statute of repose and that if the issue did appear before the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, the Catanzaro position would not be
followed. 139
The Third Circuit adopted the view of the scope of the statute
of repose as set forth in Kovach, Vasquez, and Springman in the
case of Luzadder v Despatch Oven Co. 1 40 In Luzadder, the plain-
tiff's decedent was severely injured when a gas-fired bottle-making
molt oven exploded in the plant in which he worked. 4 ' The trial
court granted the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment
based on the statute of repose, but the Third Circuit reversed. 42
The Third Circuit stated that manufacturers have been left out of
the statute of repose's protection for good reason-because the ex-
tension of coverage under the statute of repose to include manu-
facturers "would cut the heart out of Pennsylvania's product liabil-
ity law, by immunizing any manufacturing company fortunate
enough to have its product turned into an improvement to real
property.' 143 The Third Circuit noted that there exists no logical
reason to draw distinctions between manufacturers of different
products, such as the maker of a furnace, were he to be protected
under Section 5536, and the maker of an automobile whose prod-
uct could never be found to be an improvement to real property. 4
138. Id at 68.
139. Id at 69.
140. 834 F2d 355 (3d Cir 1987).
141. Luzadder, 834 F2d at 356. Decedent was not killed by the explosion but commit-
ted suicide approximately seventeen months after suffering his injuries, prompting his per-
sonal representative to include a wrongful death claim in addition to all other claims. Id.
142. Id at 357.
143. Id at 359.
144. Id at 360. The court noted that a similar distinction was discussed in Foley v
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa 1, 68 A2d 517 (1949). In Foley, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that the principle of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.,
217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916), which held that a manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable
care to third persons, notwithstanding the absence of an actual contractual relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and the third party, should be applied only to chattels. The Foley
court stated that:
There is no logical basis for such a distinction, and it would obviously be absurd to
hold that a manufacturer would be liable if negligent in building a small, readily mov-
able tank which would undoubtedly be a chattel, but not in building an enormously
large and correspondingly more potentially dangerous one that legalistically was clas-
sified as realty. The principle inherent in the MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. case
and those that have followed it is that one who manufactures and delivers any article
or structure with the knowledge that it will be subject to use by others, must, for the
protection of human life and property, use proper care to make it reasonably safe for
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The court chose not to follow the Catanzaro decision for two rea-
sons. 145 First, a decision of the superior court is not an absolute
pronouncement of state law, but only presumptive evidence of
what state law may be.14 6 Second, the Catanzaro decision signifi-
cantly changed Pennsylvania tort law, and such a change should
emanate from the supreme court, not the superior court.
4 7
When one compares the manner in which the federal courts have
interpreted the statute of repose with the interpretation given by
the superior court, it must be concluded that the federal court
opinions are more deliberate and better reasoned. It is submitted
that the federal courts, not the superior court, have properly read
and applied the Construction Projects Statute of Repose.
V. CONCLUSION
The effect of the Catanzaro decision and the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's failure in McCormick to rectify that misapplication
of the statute of repose is that individuals are having their causes
of action against manufacturers wrongly barred under the statute
of repose whereas the action should remain alive under the princi-
ples articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Webb. The
superior court has effectively diminished the rights of plaintiffs
under Pennsylvania product liability law because of their mistaken
interpretation and application of the statute of repose. The federal
courts, however, have employed a very logical and judicially sound
approach in determining that the Construction Projects Statute of
Repose was clearly not intended to apply to manufacturers of de-
fective products whose products are incorporated into real prop-
erty improvements by others.
Applying the statute of repose as it is currently interpreted to
the hypothetical situation set forth at the beginning of this com-
mentary, the homeowners' action against the builder of the home
improvement would clearly be barred. The twelve-year period has
undoubtedly passed, an addition built on to a home would clearly
fall under the common usage of what is understood to be an im-
provement to real property, and the builder of the improvement
such users and for those who may come into its vicinity; certainly the application of
that principle cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical distinction be-
tween a chattel and a structure built upon the land.
Foley, 68 A2d at 533.
145. Luzadder, 834 F2d at 359-60.
146. Id.
147. Id (citations omitted).
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quite obviously furnished the design, planning, supervision or ob-
servation of construction, or construction of the actual improve-
ment itself.
Suppose, however, that the injuries and damages suffered by the
homeowner were caused in part by the collapse of an outdoor awn-
ing, which was part of the improvement installed on the home in
1975. When the plaintiff joins the manufacturer of the awning as a
defendant in his or her action, the unsettled foundation of the
Construction Projects Statute of Repose becomes disturbingly
clear. If the action is commenced in state court, the Catanzaro ra-
tionale would most likely be applied and the court would conclude
that the manufacturer is shielded from liability under the statute
of repose. If, however, diversity existed between the manufacturing
company and the plaintiff, then the action against the manufac-
turer of the awning would proceed on the merits since, in federal
court, Section 5536 protection properly does not extend to manu-
facturers of products that become incorporated into real property
improvements. It is up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to set-
tle the foundation upon which the Construction Projects Statute of
Repose should lie. That foundation is easily discovered upon ex-
amining the language of the statute itself, the applicable legislative
history, and the basic policies underlying long standing principles
of Pennsylvania tort law. Therein it is clear that a manufacturer
who puts a defective product into the stream of commerce should
be liable for injuries resulting therefrom, notwithstanding the fact
that the product may have been incorporated into an improvement
to real property.
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